Introduction
Save the Children Trainer: Now that you have the business plan and you have the money to implement it, your neighbors' house burned down, they have kids, and the whole family is thrown in the streets. What would you do?
Hussein: Of course we would give the money to the family, there is no doubt about it. Are you asking us to think?
The unanimous nods from Hussein's classmates in a Save the Children program to teach microcredit to the marginalized youth of Amman, Jordan, angered the trainer, who told the future entrepreneurs: "You are never going to be good businessmen, I have been teaching you all semester long to focus on your aims and goals, to ignore any distractions, and to think of yourselves only." 1 The reprimand reflects the ideal trajectory of the creation of the neoliberal subject: the entrepreneurial (train for microcredits), individualistic (think of yourself) self who believes in the free market (focus on aims and goals). The story, however, does not stop at this point. The crux is in the response of one the trainees, who addressed the class saying:
I am the son of Baqa' and my neighbor's house burns down and you are telling me I should ignore that and focus on getting my business started! To hell with you and the SMEs, I do not want to be an entrepreneur...If having my own business is going to lead me to forget my neighbors...If it is going to lead me to ignore the pain of my neighbors, I do not want to "be my own boss" [as encouraged by the trainer]. Do you know who my neighbors are? They are either my cousins, my uncles, or even brothers and sisters and you are asking me to forget about them and focus on my business…I do not need your training. We poor people survive by leaning on each other by helping each other, we live all together, not like you in West Amman [where] each lives in his own world! This local encounter highlights many of the tensions surrounding neoliberal subject creation in the context of development interventions that form the focus of this article. In the first instance, it clearly represents a local contestation of a microcredit training program and highlights the need for ethnographic research that can identify the spaces between discursive formation and on-the-ground practice, in order to understand what Ferguson (2010) refers to as the "complex relation between the intentionality of planning and the strategic intelligibility of outcomes." Governable subjects do not represent blank slates on which neoliberal processes are inscribed. Local geographic and historical contexts, social relationships, identities, and consciousnesses continue to be important in the reworking of capitalism everywhere in the world. In this case, the conflict led to the trainees leaving the class, and classes were cancelled until the director of the program intervened to resolve the dispute. Such conflicts have been the focus of a growing body of studies on the creation of neoliberal subjectivity, as discussed below.
However, two further observations about this conflict are important to note. Previous studies of such conflicts have tended to focus on the role of culture in generating local contestations of neoliberal subject formation. For example, Adas (2006) notes the role of Islamic culture in generating opposition to the promotion of individualism in microcredit programs, while Karim (2001 Karim ( , 2011 and Bernal and Grewal (2014) argue that NGO programs for women, rather than leading to the creation of neoliberal subjects, consolidated traditional forms and relationships of patriarchal power. Yet in the example above, it is not just culture, but a form of class consciousness that sparked trainee opposition to the program; in particular, trainees were committed to principles of collective solidarity and action, based on an understanding of themselves as embedded within and attached to social relationships of family, neighborhood, and the broader status of being "poor"-a status that in the Arab world is explicitly invoked as a marker of socio-economic class (Antoun 2000 , Hourani, Khoury, and Wilson 2005 , Khoury 2003 , Parker 2009 , Shryock 2000 , Traboulsi 2014 ).
Finally, although this encounter clearly illustrates the existence of local contestation of neoliberal training programs, it does not mean that these programs have necessarily been failures. For although classes were briefly cancelled, the trainees involved in this dispute subsequently returned and remained with the training program for its duration. The program continued to train other young Jordanians from the same neighborhood for two more years after this incident. The reasons for their (and other such programs') success, however, have had less to do with their ability to reshape trainees' cultural ideologies and identities than with economic and other material incentives and constraints that push and pull the local poor to take up the subject positions offered to them through these development programs. Four of the trainees involved in this dispute, for example, were later able to obtain funding through the program for their own smallscale business projects.
In this article, I draw on an ethnographic study of an entrepreneurship and microcredit youth program in Jordan to argue for the importance of class analysis and attention to political economy in understanding how local communities question and oppose neoliberal governmentality. In recent studies of the spread of neoliberalism and the creation of neoliberal subjects around the world, there has been a danger of overemphasizing the role of cultural consent and conviction and neglecting the continuing importance of what Marx (1992) once referred to as the "dull compulsion of economic relations" in shaping local acquiescence to neoliberal forms of social and political practice. In the context of the postcolonial turn to identity-as well as in critiques of previous class-based theories of social conflict as being overly simplistic, deterministic, and Eurocentric-there has been a tendency to throw the baby out with the bath water and ignore all forms of class consciousness and action (Mintz 1986 ). In Jordan, as elsewhere in the Arab world, social theories of class that were derived from Western industrial societies were always of limited relevance. Consequently, many scholars have argued for the importance of focusing analysis on other social stratifications, such as religion, family, and tribal affiliation (e.g., Amawi 1992 , Amin 2011 , Batatu 2004 , Baylouny 2003 , Rasheed and Mundy 1991 , Sengebusch and Sonay 2014 . However, as Traboulsi argues, all such social structures intersect with class:
Social orders-i.e., groups bound by ties of blood, gender, religion, sect, or ethnicity-are not simply a reflection of class relations, but actually intersect with them without conforming exactly to their patternbearing in mind that ultimately they remain governed by the class structure to the very extent that this structure controls access to social resources, or, in other words, controls the social surplus. (2014:12) The key point here is that it is important to look at material as well as cultural issues, and at class as well as other group identities when considering the social conflict and consent surrounding the spread of neoliberal policy and practice. This article proceeds by reviewing the literature on neoliberal subject creation and its contestation before turning to the specific case of microcredit training in Jordan. Using this case from Jordan, the article analyzes both local contestation and acquiescence to these training programs-not just by trainees, but also by trainers-in terms of material incentives and constraints, as well as the influence of class consciousness and awareness.
Governmentality, Cultural Agency, and Class
Starting in the 1990s, a body of academic literature developed that argued that neoliberalism needed to be understood less as a matter of the retreat of the state from the economy, and more as a process of autonomizing society through the proliferation of new quasi-economic models of individualised activity (Barry, Osborne, and Rose 1996; Rose 1992 Rose , 1999 ). The emphasis is on the changing role of government, predicated on interventions to create the organizational as well as subjective conditions for entrepreneurship by inciting individuals to become entrepreneurs. In anthropology, geography, and development studies, this shift led to the global proliferation of studies of governmentality focused on the creation of neoliberal subjects in increasingly diverse contexts, particularly through a wide range of microcredit, enterprise, and other developmental and educational interventions (Appadurai 2002; Bryant 2002; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Goldman 2001a Goldman , 2001b McDonald 1999; Moore 2000) . Studies of neoliberal governmentality flourished with ethnographic research on microcredit, which was seen as epitomizing the creation of neoliberal subjects-the entrepreneur, the volunteer, the responsibilized (Barry, Osborne, and Rose 1996; Cruikshank 1993; Hyatt 1997; Rose 1979 Rose , 1988 Rose , 1989 Rose , 1996 . In the Arab world, there have been a number of studies that have analyzed microcredit programs similar to the one I describe and have tried to contextualize such programs and document the range of responses they elicit from their participants (e.g., Elyachar 2005 , Al Husseiny 2010 . These studies provide invaluable insights into how beneficiaries of microcredit negotiate program policies and modulate processes of neoliberal subject formation based on their own situated interests and agendas.
The concept of governmentality has been useful in opening up space for examining how power operates in both NGOs and multinational corporations, since it decenters the state as a monolithic source of power. Governmental power, in this view, operates not through imposition or repression, but rather by cultivating the conditions in which non-sovereign subjects are constituted. However, a more recent wave of studies has raised concerns over the overly totalizing and universalizing claims of some conceptions of governmentality (Hart 2004 , Lawson 2007 ). Gupta, for instance, argues that "we have to consider how governmentality is itself a conjunctural and crisis-ridden enterprise, how it engenders its own mode of resistance and makes, meets, molds, or is contested by new subjects " (2001:96) . Ferguson (1994) suggests that an analytics of political power might need to look at more than just what different actors want to happen and instead emphasize how these plans are played out in a field of contestation against other actors with their own agendas. The focus on rationalities as the privileged entry point of analysis might, in fact, be poorly suited to understanding the strategic dimensions of programs of rule when we are dealing with planned interventions by powerful parties, for it is tempting to see in the discourse and intentions of such parties the logic that defines the train of events. Hence, many ethnographic studies have sought to probe counter-hegemonic possibilities and have been conducted with an emphasis on conjunctural articulations of development ideologies with situated material processes.
Attending to conjunctural specificities not only challenges understandings of neoliberal development as an unfolding teleology, it also reveals the concrete historical possibilities of transformation. Attending to conjunctural specificities not only challenges understandings of neoliberal development as an unfolding teleology, it also reveals the concrete historical possibilities of transformation. A wide range of examples of resistance, contestation and transformation can be found in recent research literature. Shakya and Rankin (2008) thus show how the poor bring their own "poverty truths" to bear on their practices as the beneficiaries of development. Rankin (2008) argues that in socialist market economy Vietnam, microfinance has been harnessed to an ideologically contrary project of extending state banking. Roy (2010:191) explores the multiplicities of microfinance in the Grameen Bank and BRAC in Bangladesh, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and a scattered array of "double agent" experts, who manage to "practice critique" from within the heart of the Washington consensus. Elyachar's (2005) study of craftsmen in Cairo who were turned into entrepreneurs by international and state agencies focused on how these workers were able to manipulate the emergent enterprise system according to pre-existing interests, identities, and ideologies. These craftsmen were well aware that the Egyptian state and its international financial allies and development agencies were dependent upon their success, as the workers helped to provide jobs and prevent the young male population from erupting in violence (for other similar examples, see Ferguson and Gupta 2002, Hyatt 1997) . Other studies on microfinance and microcredit in the Middle East have focused on pious neoliberalism, that is, how Islamist groups use microcredit and other financing forms to create the "pious neoliberal subject," a process through which both neoliberalism and religion are transformed (Atia 2012 , Kamran 2012 , Moumtaz 2012 , Tuğal 2013 . Roy (2010) maps the use of microcredit by Hizbullah and Hamas and claims they use it as an element of their political resistance.
All of these studies have provided invaluable insights into how critical ethnography can reveal the irregularities of programs of governmentality and their contestation from below. However, most of these studies have focused on different forms of cultural resistance (based on gender, family relations, religion, and identity) and neglected the continuing importance of class analysis. This focus on culture and identity is part of a more general turn away from political economyoccurring within postcolonial studies (Chibber 2013 ). Yet the rejection of what has been dubbed by some anthropologists as "economism" and the "tyrannies of science" should not lead to a retreat from questions of capitalism or to premature celebrations of cultural globalization (Hart 2004) . In this article, I argue that we need to draw on class analysis and political economy, not negate the importance of culture, cultural identities, and resistance, but, rather, to add to previous cultural analyses and thereby extend the critique of governmentality studies both in Jordan and elsewhere.
There are two key issues here. First, the "cultural turn" has led to a risk of over-emphasizing cultural and ideological bases of action while neglecting the role of basic economic and material factors (Jessop and Sum 2001, Mitchell 1990) . While culture and ideology are, of course, important in shaping practice, sometimes people act not through consent or conviction but through more basic pragmatic material interests. The second issue is that while the notions of class identity and class consciousness have been correctly problematized both in Western and Arab contexts over the past decades-in terms of the limited and declining relevance of clearly defined working class and middle class identities for many individuals and groups-class awareness and class-based ideologies nevertheless continue to be highly relevant in the Arab world as elsewhere. This includes both critical awareness of what are often radical economic, social, and political inequalities as well as divergent ideological values and attachments linked with different economic positions in society (Amin 2010 , Traboulsi 2014 . In the wake of the Arab Spring, a revived interest in class analysis has become prominent. A growing body of literature argues that the Arab Spring was a result of the deepening inequality caused by neoliberal policies (Dahi 2011 , Hanieh 2013 , Joya 2012 . Accordingly, many revisionist scholars are calling for a renewed need to include class analysis in the study of cultural history of the Middle East (Jones 2015) .
While much of this literature is based on classic definitions of class as based on material wealth, others have focused on the changing nature and increasing heterogeneity of Arab middle classes and the need to analyze class with a global perspective (Bayat 2013 , Kandil 2012 , Khosrokhavar 2012 , adopt socio-economic approaches to the study of lifestyle and taste (Bilkhorz 2014 , Neubert 2014 , and adopt a historical perspective on the specifically colonialist contexts of class formation in the Middle East (Watenpaugh 2014) . Criticisms of economism and class determinism are, of course, important; but they should not lead to the neglect of the continuing significance of political economy, class awareness and class-based consciousness and ideology. As Devine and Savage (2005) argue, there is a need for "richer qualitative data in studies of class identity so that researchers can explore subjects' accounts for the 'nuances of class identification,' in order to avoid 'abstract expectations' of class identities and class awareness " (2005 " ( :12, as quoted in Rajiva 2013 . Extending this point, Finn (2009) These are the comments of a student from Jabal Al Nadhif (one of the pockets of poverty in Amman) commenting on her visit to the West-as in West Amman. The visit was part of Save the Children USA's program tailored to teach tolerance to the poor youth of Amman. These teaching for tolerance programs started after the November 9, 2005, attacks on three Amman hotels, which left 60 dead and hundreds injured. The government and the international community immediately blamed extremist Islamists from poor areas, and NGOs were engaged to teach youth tolerance to prevent any such attacks in the future. Targeting poor youth from East Amman, these programs sought to "show the poor, where terrorism is breeding, that people in West Amman who were the targets of terrorist attacks, are just like them." 2 In the wake of the 2005 attacks, the stability of the country became a priority for American foreign policy. After Israel and Egypt, Jordan received the largest amount of US aid from 2002 to 2007. The gap between the rich and poor, who live in different parts of Amman, was so huge that the poor people of Amman thought they were moving not just to a different neighborhood but a different country altogether, a country in the West where everything is "neat, clean, different like we see on the television." 3 Jordan was one of the first countries in the Arab world to implement structural adjustment and privatization programs. Economic liberalization started under King Hussein in 1987, but accelerated with King Abdullah's rise to power in 1995. As is the case elsewhere, the introduction of a market economy exacerbated class divisions and centralized wealth in the hands of the few. In 2008, after 20 years of market reform, ten percent of Jordanians earned 40 percent of the total income of the country, while the 35 percent of the population below the poverty line earned only two percent of the total income (Saif 2011) . Amman itself is home to 25 percent of the total poor population and 90 percent of the wealthiest people (the top quintile of earners) in the country (Saif 2011) . The accumulation of wealth in the hands of the few has divided Amman into gated communities, home to the rich and overpopulated slums. The disconnection between "old" and "new," "rich" and "poor," the gated communities and the slums of Amman, was further exacerbated by the networks of roads and bridges tailored to "connect rich and gated Amman to the global market and isolate it from its poor neighborhood. Rich areas are connected together and to the airport in a way to avoid passing through the poor areas of the city" (Parker 2009 ). Class differentiation is not only built on material wealth, but is closely intertwined with other social groupings, such as family and tribe. Hourani (2014) shows the interpenetration of the political and the economic in the formation of politico-economic oligarchies based on families, tribes and merchant associations that are still influential in the economic/political scene in Jordan today (see also Amawi 1992 , Razzaz 1991 , Sukarieh 2008 .
At the turn of the century, many new American-led projects targeting youth, women, and civil society were piloted in Jordan and then exported to other Arab states. Jordan is geostrategically very important for the US, especially given the war on Iraq. Hence, the need to stabilize the country. This was partly accomplished by turning it into a workshop of empire: between 2003 and 2007, most USAID projects tailored to the Arab region were piloted in Jordan, such as Injaz, the Arabic version of Junior Achievement, and many of the Save the Children projects, including the youth microcredit projects under discussion. Such projects focus on promoting microcredit and local entrepreneurship, but target different segments of Jordan's population. While all provide funding and training, the scale of funding and the nature of training varies considerably. One set of projects is tailored to upper-middle class university graduates and provides seed money and business plan development assistance for projects that are often national and even international in scale. Participants usually come from the wealthiest families in Jordan and tend to be graduates of business programs at American universities, whether regional satellite or US campuses. 4 The second type of microcredit is tailored to the middle class, and entails helping youth receive small bank loans to start companies along with providing some training in business plans from the NGOs. 5 The third type, which is the focus of this article, is microcredit tailored to the poor in Jordan with the aim of "training them to be their own bosses," as David Waldo, Save the Children USA director, explained. Jordanian youth in these programs are thus subject to what Rose (1996) calls "technologies of the self" with NGOs promoting transparency, entrepreneurship and leadership as concepts that lead individuals to assume responsibility for their own life situations and destinies. All of these programs focus on training for microcredit and employability, learning success stories, and developing skills, such as CV writing , starting a business, and conducting interviews.
Save the Children USA's Najah program (meaning "success") was one of many microcredit projects that targeted the poor and marginalized. The program is located in Amman's Jabal Al Nadhif-one of 32 pockets of poverty designated by the government that were sites for 20 different microcredit training programs run by Save the Children. Najah starts by training the young participants to be entrepreneurs, teaching skills such as developing an idea, reading the market, testing the idea, formulating a business plan, looking for funds, and presenting the idea to funders. During the semester, students also read success stories of Jordanian businesspeople who have made it in the market. They either visit their businesses or listen to them in the center. The stories are told in a teleological way: most of the businessmen are self-made, successful because of their hard work. Trainees also take English classes since it is "the global language" or "the language of business." They are told that "if you want to be an entrepreneur you need to learn how to write in English, no banks accept business plans that are not written in English," as emphasized by their teacher during the first English session. 6 Najah, unlike other microcredit projects elsewhere around the world, does not aim to capitalize on the poor (Roy 2010 ). Participants were not asked to take out loans to start their own entrepreneurial projects, but were offered up to 400 Jordanian dinars (equivalent to $600 USD) out of a fund paid for by the private sector, Save the Children, and USAID. The training seminar lasts three months, with students meeting four times a week for three hours.
The data for this article are drawn from a larger collection of observations and interviews that I conducted with NGOs in Amman between 2005 and 2008. In particular, the article focuses on observational and interview data I collected from an NGO run seminar during the summer of 2007. In this seminar, there were 17 student entrepreneurs in attendance, including 12 males and five females, all in their 20s. All had dropped out of school either "because they needed to work to help their families" or "because the public schools in the area are in very bad conditions and [they got] beaten all the time." 7 Interviews were all conducted in Arabic. The workshops were also conducted in Arabic, with English used only for technical words. In this article, I focus on what is going on in the classroom itself, while in other pieces, I have analyzed the programs at a more general level (Sukarieh 2012 (Sukarieh , 2015 .
Student Resistance to the Tenets of Microcredit Training
One of the core courses offered as part of the Najah program was called "Success Stories." The Success Stories curriculum hoped to inspire students by exposing them to stories of business and economic elites in Jordan. "We are in the process of developing success stories of these leaders to inspire youth and tell them if they could do it, you can too, you just need to persevere, take risks, be open to change, and learn how to work in the global economy," said Soraya Salti, one of the developers of the Success Stories program. "We want to provide them with role models from their own society to tell them that it happens here in your city, it is not restricted to the American dreams." 8 The success stories, of course, did not discuss the social background and cultural capital of these elites, who were presented as being self-made. In addition to providing success stories to youth in writing, the program invited "entrepreneurs" to tell their stories individually and have a discussion with the class on-site (or, sometimes, in hotels or in their places of business). These encounters, however, sometimes had the opposite of the intended effect. For example, Injaz invited Nour Kabariti, the daughter of a Jordanian prime minister and member of a prominent upper class family. In a fairytale-like way, Kabariti recounted her success story of building a chocolate factory in Jordan in the 1990s:
After I graduated from school, I wanted to come back and work for my country, and I was and still am against work in the public sector, I found it very limiting and non-creative. I remembered as a child I always wished there was a Jordanian chocolate factory. I studied the market, discussed it with my friends and family, and everybody encouraged me. I then looked for the place, and travelled to buy cheap cocoa and started the project in 1995. Now we employ 50 workers and the Jordanian chocolate is marketed not only in Jordan but also throughout the Middle East and we are thinking of expanding now. And here we see the dream of a child to have Jordanian chocolate was turned into a chocolate factory that employs many workers and helps so many families. Who would want to work in the public sector or even in the private sector when you can be your own boss?
Kabariti never once mentioned money. During the subsequent discussion, one of the students asked about the startup capital necessary to launch the factory. Kabariti responded that she had 100,000 Jordanian dinars in her own savings to begin with (worth about a half million US dollars in the 1990s). Her reply was followed with another question about the source of the money. Her answer: she received help from family and friends. Immediately, one of the students retorted: "If I sell not only my family and my friends, and all my neighborhood on my project, I won't be able to collect a fraction of the amount you gathered in the 90s now." The trainer tried to contain the situation by referring to funds one can get from banks: "Yes, but you need a sponsor to get funds and/or you need to take up a loan against your property." "What if we do not have property and no one can sponsor us because we are broke?" queried the student. Similar discussions arose with almost every encounter with entrepreneurs. In a country like Jordan, as one student reflected, where from the "family name you can spot the social class of the entrepreneurs, it is hard to sell the lie of self-made, hard-working entrepreneurs who made it without any support, and only because they are smart and good-looking and creative and do not want to work in the public sector."
Over the course of the entire three months that the Najah program ran, trainers repeatedly faced collective student resistance to the core tenets of the curriculum. This resistance often broke out into open disputes over claims made by trainers in class, leading to repeated collective student walkouts and silent refusals to participate or engage. Most of the time, resistance came from the male students, and those who came from families with socialist political beliefs. While this defiance was based on a number of interconnecting factors, such as cultural identities, family, religious identity, and gender, it was also clearly based on the students' strong class awareness and class consciousness. As (Hanieh 2013) argues, the introduction of neoliberal measures (one of the causes of the Arab Spring) has led to the disenchantment of the middle classes and poor alike, as a result of growing inequality and the lack of social mobility. This class-based resistance, moreover, draws on a class identity that is based both on an awareness of differential material wealth and well-being, as well an attachment to differential values, tastes, and preferences; in other words, it is a kind of class analysis that combines both socio-economic and cultural elements. In Distinction, Bourdieu (1984:100) argues that classes cannot be defined solely on the basis of a single criterion, such as occupation, but are constituted by other features as well, such as gender, race, age, ethnicity, and the availability of social, cultural, and symbolic capital. It is not the sum of these features that defines a class, but rather the "structure of relations between all the pertinent properties" (1984:100).
As discussed earlier, resistance sometimes entailed student commitment to distinct, class-based sets of values: collectivism, rejection of individualism, and a sense of solidarity with family, neighbors, and the poor. Contestation of the Najah program and resistance to the internalization of the neoliberal subject was also a product of students' sense that the program was seeking to push them into acting like Jordanian elites, whom they saw as being "thieves," "crooks," and "unethical," and whose perceived cultural values and practices they strongly rejected. For example, students "thought the job interview was part of an attempt to have them act outside of their character in order to get the job," Khaled el Saheb, one of the Najah program trainers, told me. He elaborated:
Part of the training involved preparing students to answer some of the common interview questions. When the interviewer asks the job applicant about his weaknesses, and the recommendation for this was that the applicant should not talk much about his real weaknesses and that he should indicate that he is working on getting them fixed, many students thought that this was an attempt to mislead the interviewer, to make them act as rich people do all the time, mislead and lie. They argued that they should be very direct about their weakness areas, and the fact that they may be doing nothing to fix those weaknesses. 9 Students gave similar accounts. "Rich people get jobs because they are liars, it does not mean I have to lie too," explained one of the students. "I know they get their jobs because they have connections, they go to good schools, they come from rich families, they get the jobs because jobs are made for them, not because they know how not to talk about their weaknesses or they are better in doing interviews than us." Another disconnect involved the trainers' advice to avoid talking negatively about a previous job or employer. Some students felt that they should speak openly about previous employers and their problems.
As for why such conflict arose, Khaled explained that the students thought "it is not honorable" to lie, and that lying "is not part of their values." Further, as Khaled notes, the students "felt that the rich employers would be upset if we talk about their likes, as if it is always our fault we left the job or we were kicked from it. It is always the responsibility of the poor not the harshness, meanness, and oppression of the rich employers." 10 Program trainers saw student concerns about lying as directly linked to class-based cultures. As Khaled explained, "it is maybe a stereotype, but It is normal that there is a faultine that divides the rich and poor of Amman based on values. The Westernized elites of the city pride [themselves] in giving up all values they deem traditional as part of their identity as modern, while the poor side hold more to the traditional values and it becomes their claim to distinction and them being more Jordanian than the richer. It does not mean that the rich people do not hold to traditional values, but at least they try to hide that so that they appear modern. 11
This observation is congruent with other studies in Arab and other societies on the critical positions women and the poor hold in preserving tradition and values (e.g., Sayigh 2002) .
In addition to students' attachment to different cultural values, preferences, and ideologies, their resistance was further motivated by a clear awareness of the extreme social and economic inequality in Jordan and their positions within the highly stratified society-as articulated in the discussion with Nour Kabariti and her chocolate factory. Despite the program's emphasis on individual agency and responsibility, students were keenly aware of the structural limitations placed on their own individual actions. "We have been targeted by programs that will teach us employability skills with a total absence of jobs in the market," said Hussein, a 19-year-old high school graduate who had been "moving from one program on microcredit to another, one focusing on writing CVs, and another on how to do interviews," without being able to secure a job. Students' own individual and collective experiences led them to strongly question claims made by program trainers that "the market is open for everybody and you just need to work hard to make it." As Hussein reiterated:
Why should I advise others to join these programs that focus on skills and life-long learning with a total absence of jobs in the market? Why should I believe what these programs say? If I am a responsible volunteer, entrepreneur, young person and I have no money to put my ideas into projects, or I do not have the connections to find a job, why should I believe in the teaching of the programs? 12
Class consciousness was also reflected in the interviews with students concerning differential treatment due to their socio-economic status. As Bourdieu (1984) argues, class is not just about having values as a class different from other classes, it is reflected in the way a certain class is treated differently by other groups in society. Students in the Najah program were very aware of the ways in which they were being treated and judged in ways different from elites-both by the program itself and in Jordanian society more generally. When students were taught about the steps to start a new business enterprise, they were told to dream small. "You start small and then you grow," said one teacher. The teachers gave them options that would require almost no startup capital. On the table, were small projects such as "making pickles and distributing them to hotels around Amman, cleaning and cutting vegetables and selling them, setting up a tea and coffee booth on the streets, as well as making and selling falafel sandwiches." During these sessions, the students complained that "they want us to stay poor":
Why do I need a course on microenterprise to start making pickles or falafel sandwiches? If this is the case, then all the people in my neighborhood are entrepreneurs. So then why do they say that Arab culture is not entrepreneurial? We have been starting these things forever. 13 Moreover, the "self-made" entrepreneurs' stories made students doubt the training on the characteristics of an "ultimate entrepreneur," raising questions about why poor and rich behaviors are analyzed differently. "How come they can depend on their parents and ask for help, and we are told to be individualistic?" asked Ayman. "If one of us gets a job as a janitor in a school through his connections, we are accused of nepotism and the government fights us, but if a rich person get a huge project through his connections, it is called inside information or social networking." "We are also told to use our connections," Ayman argues, "but my connections can get me to be a janitor, theirs can make them ministers, how is that called self made then?" Such encounters made the students realize the gap between the parts of Amman where they lived and the parts where the "ultimate" class of entrepreneurs lived. "It must be nice to be an entrepreneur," said Ali. "You only need 500 years after you start your pickle stand," jokes Ali's friend, Haytham, "and you can move and live with the other entrepreneurs of the city." 14 Together with such keen appraisals of local social dynamics, the student entrepreneurs were cognizant of-and critical of-larger issues as well. Their resistance was not just limited to their awareness of inequalities and differences within national borders, but extended globally. Student resistance to the program was prompted not only by the explicit claims and values promoted by the program, but by the fact that Najah was promoted and funded by the United States and, specifically, USAID. In Amman, the US is widely seen as an imperial, occupying force, and the perception was especially pronounced in the summer of 2006-during the war in Lebanon as well as the ongoing war in Iraq-when a part of this research was conducted. "Why would we believe the Americans have our interests in their heart while they are waging war in Iraq and helping Israel?" Hussein asked. 15 Haytham added: "America is an Empire, all what Americans care for and want is to steal the oil and they want to control us, nothing that comes from them is good for us. Since their involvement in the region, tell me one good thing they did and it was for our own benefit." Lama, another student in the group, argued that: They, the Americans, conspired against Jamal Abdel Nasser who loved the poor, they are always siding with the Israelis against us and they waged wars two times on Iraq because Iraq was a strong state and Israel does not like strong states in the region, and because Iraq used to give oil to Jordanians and it was helping the poor. They keep dictators in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait because they steal their oil and make them oppress us all. Do you want to tell me they invaded Iraq because they love the Kuwaitis?
Abdel Rahman, a 23-year-old from the Palestinian camp of Wahdat, interrupted Haytham and continued the conversation:
Iraq used to give Jordan oil for free, now we have to pay for heating, for car oil, for everything. We do not hate Americans, no, we hate America as Empire siding with dictators and against us the people and stealing our resources. We hate imperialism, we do not hate all Americans, we hate the American government and our governments who are traitors too.
Haytham claims that the "world is divided into poor and rich countries not because they work hard and we do not, but because imperialism steals the money of the poor countries and their resources like the US stealing the oil of the Arabs. So how do they steal our money and now they want to teach me how to make money through microcredit, there is something not logical."
Haytham's arguments are echoed by Mohammad Marsi, a political scientist who analyzes polls in the Jordanian Center for Policy Studies at the Jordanian University. In an interview, Marsi explained to me that:
If one looks at class in the polling of perception of US policy, it is obvious that the more you go up the ladder of the social classes, perception of the US becomes more favorable. This is due in part [to] the interconnection of interests, western education, as well as closeness to the royal court. But also the poor's perception of the US is related to their religious affiliation. The intersectionality of class and religion plays a major role in the poor perception of US policies amongst the lower classes in Jordan as elsewhere." 16 Dr. Masri's points take on added resonance when one considers that programs such as Najah were explicitly intended to teach tolerance and acceptance of others and to change the perception of the poor towards the US. The Queen, along with many Jordanian businessmen, embarked on educational programs tailored to the youth living in poverty pockets that sought not just to alleviate their poverty and enhance their social mobility, but also to change their perception of the US and of rich Jordanians; as such, these programmes were explicitly seen by both their sponsors and funders as constituting a core part of the US-led war on terror (Sukarieh 2012) .
Success Amid Failure: The Prevalence of Material Over Cultural Considerations
Given the extended critique and resistance of students to the Najah program, it might seem as if the program, and its goal of creating neoliberal subjects among the poor of Jordan, was an outright failure. However, such an interpretation would be inaccurate. Despite their resistance, students kept returning to the program and stuck with it for the full three months, and new cohorts of students from the same neighborhood continued enrolling in the program in its later iterations. The overwhelming reason for this was the harsh and blunt effect of basic material constraints and incentives. All of the participants in the Najah program said that what kept them in the workshops was the "money they will get to start a project, or not to start a project, is better than nothingness." For example, as one student named Thaer explained:
I had been out of a job for more than six months, so anyway, I was not doing anything, 300 dinars after two months are not bad, well of course they pay for our transportation too, and we get to visit different parts of Amman, and meet people, eat good food sometimes, so why not? …But now if I find a job, I'd leave the training and the 300 JDs. After all, 300 JDs in three months, this is not work anyway, it is fake employment, kind of giving candies to kids to go to school.
Most of the male students had been in and out of various temporary jobs before joining the program. They left their work because it was "underpaid, and it only covered the costs of buses in and to different areas of rich Amman" or because temporary jobs ended and they could not find new ones. Joining the program between jobs was often their best option. Some of the female students joined due to a "lack of jobs in the area" and the fact that they were "constrained in [their] mobility for jobs"; further, "they [couldn't] work in [just] any job, it [had] to be respectful." 17 The youth who participated in the Najah program admitted that what was keeping them in the workshops was the "money they will get to start a project." One student, Thaer, explained that "I had been out of a job for more than six months, so anyway, I was not doing anything, 300 dinars after two months are not bad, well of course they pay for our transportation too, and we get to visit different parts of Amman, and meet people, eat good food sometimes, so why not." He added, "but now if I find a job, I'd leave the training and the 300 JDs. After all, 300 JDs in three months, this is not work anyway, it is fake employment, kind of giving candies to kids to go to school." Female students stayed in the program for different reasons. Alia said it was a way for her to leave home, otherwise she would be doing nothing. Many of them mentioned that they thought of it as learning English for free, and English was good for any job they might get. While still for others, they dreamed that meeting "important people in the city might lead for a real job for them."
Uncertainty about any real alternatives, rather than conviction about the value of the Najah program, combined with material incentives to keep students coming back to the program. Despite their many doubts, some hoped, that they would become entrepreneurs and the lies, fed by the training, might be true. They hoped, against the odds, that by visiting West Amman and meeting with entrepreneurs-"the businessmen and the thieves, and all those who control the country and control money," as Rabie says-they would be able to find jobs and "be an entrepreneur by identity, but cheap labor by profession," as Ahmad joked. Others couldn't really tell what was wrong with these programs, but they had some doubts about the intentions of rich people with a sudden interest in helping them. The fact that the money came from the US, a country they saw as an enemy state, only heightened their skepticism. But such suspicions were not strong enough to shutter the program in the face of economic need, and the students felt confident they could use the program without becoming completely beholden to it. As Salma, a 24-year-old student, said during a discussion of the evils of US imperialism: "Oh, imperialism? Imperialism, old ideas. Let's work, if it works, fine. If not we try other things. I do not care who teaches me, I just want to work hard and get a job." The young women, in particular, were more passive than the young men in the program and cared less about thinking the project through. "They won't change me, I just want to find a job and I will never be like them or buy American ideas, I just want to find a job," said Rola, a 19-year-old high school dropout.
Conclusion
The trainers shared many of students' concerns about the microcredit programs. Coming from lower middle class backgrounds themselves, with various degrees but no work following Jordan's massive privatization initiatives, many young people found NGOs to have the only available jobs. As Nada, a Najah trainer, claimed, the trainers were themselves subject to coaching for few months by either the "elites of Jordan who are in administrative positions in these NGOs and who graduated from American Universities, or by Americans who come and give training in Jordan [and other Arab countries]." A 28-year-old Palestinian, Nada herself was in disbelief that Save the Children USA would have the interests of poor youth in mind. "I feel these concepts are nice, but I do not know, I keep thinking something is wrong with these programs, but I can't tell what, they are good concepts I mean, but I have my doubts, something is not right, what do you think?"
The racist attitude of the head of Save the Children USA in Jordan made the trainer even more suspicious. "He never listens to what we have to say, he thinks he knows what is best for the youth here more than we do, he looks at us as if we do not understand anything, and he knows everything," she explained. "He looks down on us just because he is American and we are Jordanians." She continued:
You know, if I find another job now I will quit, but then where shall I work? I will move from one NGO to the next. And if not an American NGO, it will be a British or a German one, they all work under the command of the US NGOs and coordinate. It will be moving to a different level of shit...The only thing that keeps me in these programs, well, besides it is a job for me, is the thought that maybe these young people will benefit a bit from the training, well even if they don't become businessmen at least they are learning English. 18 Whether the trainers' analysis of the coordination of different NGOs is accurate, or whether there is no difference between the Jordanian state and the American state, as the students believe, is not the point here. What is important is that the particular moments in which the implementation of these programs occurred created a mode of resistance to the subjectification of these youth through what they believe is American imperialism.
This study focused on one site of microcredit teaching in Jordan. More studies are needed to grapple with class analysis as part of the slippages, openings, and contradictions that are crucial to any effort to understand the possibilities for more far-reaching social change, especially after the recent wave of uprisings in Arab cities and the ongoing economic crisis of neoliberalism. The inclusion of marginalized youth in the programs of entrepreneurship and their continuous exclusion from economic life undermines their internalization of the responsibilization rhetoric of neoliberalism. This economic exclusion, and the injustices created by the adoption of a market economy in Jordan, has put class analysis in the forefront of resistance to the creation of the neoliberal subject. n
